Mail Index

• Thread Index

• [Full-disclosure] Secure whistleblowing feedback / reporting systems in the content of compartmented information, endpoint security [was: [NSA bitching] [formerly Re: PRISM][]]
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• [Full-disclosure] Secure whistleblowing feedback / reporting systems in the content of compartmented information, endpoint security [was: [NSA bitching] [formerly Re: PRISM][]]
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• [Full-disclosure] Intelligence agency subversions and clandestine, illicit programs; lack of popular outrage [was Re: PRISM]
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• [Full-disclosure] Foreign Intelligence Resistant systems [was Re: reasonable return on investment; better investments in security [....]]
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• [Full-disclosure] ... endpoint security, strong encryption
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• [Full-disclosure] Secure whistleblowing feedback / reporting systems in the content of compartmented information, endpoint security [was: [NSA bitching] [formerly Re: PRISM][]]
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• [Full-disclosure] Secure whistleblowing feedback / reporting systems in the content of compartmented information, endpoint security [was: [NSA bitching] [formerly Re: PRISM][]]
  • From: [email protected] ([email protected])
• audiovisual (urls)
  • From: [email protected] (brian carroll)
• NSA: The Game
  • From: [email protected] (Peter Gutmann)
• DEF CON cell network attacks
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• NSA: The Game
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• Jim Bell needs Bitcoins!
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• NSA: The Game
  • From: [email protected] (Pokokohua)
• NSA: The Game
  • From: [email protected] (Peter Gutmann)
• NSA: The Game
  • From: [email protected] (Moritz)
• ntru-crypto - Open Source NTRU Public Key Cryptography Algorithm and Reference Code
  • From: [email protected] (Cathal Garvey)
• ntru-crypto - Open Source NTRU Public Key Cryptography Algorithm and Reference Code
  • From: [email protected] (Cathal Garvey)
• Jim Bell needs Bitcoins!
  • From: [email protected] (Cathal Garvey)
• Jim Bell needs Bitcoins!
  • From: [email protected] (Lodewijk andré de la porte)
• Jim Bell needs Bitcoins!
  • From: [email protected] (Jim Bell)
• ntru-crypto - Open Source NTRU Public Key Cryptography Algorithm and Reference Code
  • From: [email protected] (Lars Luthman)
• peertech.org cert [was: DEF CON cell network attacks]
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• peertech.org cert [was: DEF CON cell network attacks]
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• audiovisual (urls)
  • From: [email protected] (Jim Bell)
• peertech.org cert [was: DEF CON cell network attacks]
  • From: [email protected] (Peter Tonoli)
• trends in cybersecurity
  • From: [email protected] ([email protected])
• trends in cybersecurity
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• Willis Ware Dies
  • From: [email protected] (John Young)
• audiovisual (urls)
  • From: [email protected] (Sean Lynch)
• audiovisual (urls)
  • From: [email protected] (Jim Bell)
• Fwd: [cryptography] A new approach to steganography
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• [cryptography] A new approach to steganography
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• audiovisual (urls)
  • From: [email protected] (Sean Lynch)
• NSA tracking cellphone locations worldwide
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• NSA tracking cellphone locations worldwide
  • From: [email protected] (Lodewijk andré de la porte)
• NSA tracking cellphone locations worldwide
  • From: [email protected] (Lodewijk andré de la porte)
• Snowden Civil War
  • From: [email protected] (John Young)
• NSA tracking cellphone locations worldwide
  • From: [email protected] ([email protected])
• NSA tracking cellphone locations worldwide
  • From: [email protected] (Juan Garofalo)
• NSA tracking cellphone locations worldwide
  • From: [email protected] (Lodewijk andré de la porte)
• NSA tracking cellphone locations worldwide
  • From: [email protected] (Juan Garofalo)
• audiovisual (urls)
  • From: [email protected] (Jim Bell)
• [Full-disclosure] Secure whistleblowing feedback / reporting systems in the content of compartmented information, endpoint security [was: [NSA bitching] [formerly Re: PRISM][]]
  • From: [email protected] (Luther Blissett)
• [Full-disclosure] Secure whistleblowing feedback / reporting systems in the content of compartmented information, endpoint security [was: [NSA bitching] [formerly Re: PRISM][]]
  • From: [email protected] (Luther Blissett)
• infra-org (urls)
  • From: [email protected] (brian carroll)
• infra-org (urls)
  • From: [email protected] (Jim Bell)
• infra-org (urls)
  • From: [email protected] (brian carroll)
• infra-org (urls)
  • From: [email protected] (brian carroll)
• infra-org (urls)
  • From: [email protected] (brian carroll)
• infra-org (urls)
  • From: [email protected] (John Young)
• Perhaps related? ABIS protocol Re: [Full-disclosure] Secure whistleblowing feedback / reporting systems in the content of compartmented information, endpoint security [was: [NSA bitching] [formerly Re: PRISM][]]
  • From: [email protected] (Odinn Cyberguerrilla)
• infra-org (urls)
  • From: [email protected] (Sean Lynch)
• infra-org (urls)
  • From: [email protected] (Sean Lynch)
• infra-org (urls)
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• infra-org (urls)
  • From: [email protected] (Bill Stewart)
• infra-org (urls)
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• NSA morale down
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• NSA morale down
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• EM-nature (was: infra-org)
  • From: [email protected] (brian carroll)
• NSA morale down
  • From: [email protected] (John Young)
• EM-nature (was: infra-org)
  • From: [email protected] (John Young)
• EM-nature
  • From: [email protected] (brian carroll)
• EM-nature (was: infra-org)
  • From: [email protected] (brian carroll)
• EM-nature (was: infra-org)
  • From: [email protected] (brian carroll)
• EM-nature (was: infra-org)
  • From: [email protected] (Bill Stewart)
• Android IMSI Catcher detection
  • From: [email protected] (Matej Kovacic)
• Android IMSI Catcher detection
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• EM-nature (was: infra-org)
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• Android IMSI Catcher detection
  • From: [email protected] (Travis Biehn)
• Android IMSI Catcher detection
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• Android IMSI Catcher detection
  • From: [email protected] (Matej Kovacic)
• Android IMSI Catcher detection
  • From: [email protected] (Cathal Garvey (Phone))
• good clocks (not using GPS) and multi-channel hw [was: sidebands of great justice]
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• Android IMSI Catcher detection
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• Android IMSI Catcher detection
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• Open phones for privacy/anonymity applications, Guardian
  • From: [email protected] ([email protected])
• Open phones for privacy/anonymity applications, Guardian
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• Open phones for privacy/anonymity applications, Guardian
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• Open phones for privacy/anonymity applications, Guardian
  • From: [email protected] (Andy Isaacson)
• Android IMSI Catcher detection
  • From: [email protected] (Matej Kovacic)
• Android IMSI Catcher detection
  • From: [email protected] (Aaron Zauner)
• Fwd: [cryptography] Which encryption chips are compromised?
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• Fwd: [zs-p2p] [Cryptography] Fwd: [IP] 'We cannot trust' Intel and Via's chip-based crypto, FreeBSD developers say
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• Fwd: [zs-p2p] [Cryptography] Fwd: [IP] 'We cannot trust' Intel and Via's chip-based crypto, FreeBSD developers say
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• Fwd: [zs-p2p] [Cryptography] Fwd: [IP] 'We cannot trust' Intel and Via's chip-based crypto, FreeBSD developers say
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• Android IMSI Catcher detection
  • From: [email protected] (Dan Staples)
• Android IMSI Catcher detection
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• Android IMSI Catcher detection
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• Android IMSI Catcher detection
  • From: [email protected] ([email protected])
• Android IMSI Catcher detection
  • From: [email protected] ([email protected])
• Android IMSI Catcher detection
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• Tradeoffs in Cyber Security
  • From: [email protected] (Juan Garofalo)
• [cryptography] Which encryption chips are compromised?
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• [cryptography] Which encryption chips are compromised?
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• Android IMSI Catcher detection
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• [cryptography] Which encryption chips are compromised?
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• catalog A & B (urls)
  • From: [email protected] (brian carroll)
• [cryptography] Which encryption chips are compromised?
  • From: [email protected] (Andy Isaacson)
• Tradeoffs in Cyber Security
  • From: [email protected] ([email protected])
• [cryptography] Which encryption chips are compromised?
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• [tor-talk] Tor 0.2.4.19 is released
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• IndependenceKey?
  • From: [email protected] (Matej Kovacic)
• [cryptography] Which encryption chips are compromised?
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• [cryptography] Which encryption chips are compromised?
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• [cryptography] Which encryption chips are compromised?
  • From: [email protected] (John Young)
• [cryptography] Which encryption chips are compromised?
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• [cryptography] Which encryption chips are compromised?
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• [cryptography] Which encryption chips are compromised?
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• Fwd: [liberationtech] PrivateSky Takedown
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• [cryptography] Which encryption chips are compromised?
  • From: [email protected] (Andy Isaacson)
• [cryptography] Which encryption chips are compromised?
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• [cryptography] Which encryption chips are compromised?
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• How long does it take to design and release a chip?
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• Multiple Plots by US, UK to Kidnap Edward Snowden
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• [cryptography] Which encryption chips are compromised?
  • From: [email protected] (Jan-Frode Myklebust)
• Joke
  • From: [email protected] (Juan Garofalo)
• Joke
  • From: [email protected] (Tom Ritter)
• BlueHat v13 crypto talks - request for leaks ;)
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• BlueHat v13 crypto talks - request for leaks ;)
  • From: [email protected] (Tom Ritter)
• BlueHat v13 crypto talks - request for leaks ;)
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• RDRAND used directly when default engines loaded in openssl-1.0.1-beta1 through openssl-1.0.1e
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• cognitive dissonance in threat modelling?
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• [Full-disclosure] RDRAND used directly when default engines loaded in openssl-1.0.1-beta1 through openssl-1.0.1e
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• RDRAND used directly when default engines loaded in openssl-1.0.1-beta1 through openssl-1.0.1e
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• Joke
  • From: [email protected] (Juan Garofalo)
• Fwd: Jacob impervious to "Rubber Hose Cryptanalysis" performed by Stewart Baker
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• Jacob impervious to "Rubber Hose Cryptanalysis" performed by Stewart Baker
  • From: [email protected] (grarpamp)
• BlueHat v13 crypto talks - request for leaks ;)
  • From: [email protected] (Peter Gutmann)
• Gmail's receiving mostly authenticated email
  • From: [email protected] (Bill Stewart)
• Services Blocking Tor [was: Joke]
  • From: [email protected] (grarpamp)
• BlueHat v13 crypto talks - request for leaks ;)
  • From: [email protected] (Tom Ritter)
• Joke
  • From: [email protected] (Al Jigong Billings)
• c4-r3kN.txt (urls)
  • From: [email protected] (brian carroll)
• Joke
  • From: [email protected] (Juan Garofalo)
• Joke
  • From: [email protected] (Al Billings)
• Joke
  • From: [email protected] (Al Billings)
• Joke
  • From: [email protected] (Juan Garofalo)
• Joke
  • From: [email protected] (Juan Garofalo)
• c4-r3kN.txt (urls)
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• Joke
  • From: [email protected] (James Brechtel)
• c4-r3kN.txt (urls)
  • From: [email protected] (brian carroll)
• Fwd: Jacob impervious to "Rubber Hose Cryptanalysis" performed by Stewart Baker
  • From: [email protected] ([email protected])
• Fwd: Jacob impervious to "Rubber Hose Cryptanalysis" performed by Stewart Baker
  • From: [email protected] (Lodewijk andré de la porte)
• Gmail's receiving mostly authenticated email
  • From: [email protected] (Peter Gutmann)
• Gmail's receiving mostly authenticated email
  • From: [email protected] (Bill Stewart)
• Gmail's receiving mostly authenticated email
  • From: [email protected] (Felix Eckhofer)
• [Cryptography] Size of the PGP userbase?
  • From: [email protected] (grarpamp)
• Gmail's receiving mostly authenticated email
  • From: [email protected] (Tom Ritter)
• Gaps in email [was: PGP userbase]
  • From: [email protected] (grarpamp)
• The next generation secure email solution
  • From: [email protected] (grarpamp)
• request for transcript: Bruce Schneier and Eben Moglen discuss a post-Snowden Internet
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• request for transcript: Bruce Schneier and Eben Moglen discuss a post-Snowden Internet
  • From: [email protected] (Juan Garofalo)
• request for transcript: Bruce Schneier and Eben Moglen discuss a post-Snowden Internet
  • From: [email protected] (Al Billings)
• BlueHat v13 crypto talks - request for leaks ;)
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• BlueHat v13 crypto talks - request for leaks ;)
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• request for transcript: Bruce Schneier and Eben Moglen discuss a post-Snowden Internet
  • From: [email protected] (Juan Garofalo)
• request for transcript: Bruce Schneier and Eben Moglen discuss a post-Snowden Internet
  • From: [email protected] (APX 808)
• request for transcript: Bruce Schneier and Eben Moglen discuss a post-Snowden Internet
  • From: [email protected] (Al Billings)
• request for transcript: Bruce Schneier and Eben Moglen discuss a post-Snowden Internet
  • From: [email protected] (Juan Garofalo)
• request for transcript: Bruce Schneier and Eben Moglen discuss a post-Snowden Internet
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• request for transcript: Bruce Schneier and Eben Moglen discuss a post-Snowden Internet
  • From: [email protected] (Juan Garofalo)
• request for transcript: Bruce Schneier and Eben Moglen discuss a post-Snowden Internet
  • From: [email protected] (Juan Garofalo)
• request for transcript: Bruce Schneier and Eben Moglen discuss a post-Snowden Internet
  • From: [email protected] (Al Billings)
• request for transcript: Bruce Schneier and Eben Moglen discuss a post-Snowden Internet
  • From: [email protected] (Al Billings)
• request for transcript: Bruce Schneier and Eben Moglen discuss a post-Snowden Internet
  • From: [email protected] (Juan Garofalo)
• request for transcript: Bruce Schneier and Eben Moglen discuss a post-Snowden Internet
  • From: [email protected] (Al Billings)
• request for transcript: Bruce Schneier and Eben Moglen discuss a post-Snowden Internet
  • From: [email protected] (Juan Garofalo)
• request for transcript: Bruce Schneier and Eben Moglen discuss a post-Snowden Internet
  • From: [email protected] (Juan Garofalo)
• request for transcript: Bruce Schneier and Eben Moglen discuss a post-Snowden Internet
  • From: [email protected] (Bill Stewart)
• [Cryptography] Size of the PGP userbase?
  • From: [email protected] (James A. Donald)
• request for transcript: Bruce Schneier and Eben Moglen discuss a post-Snowden Internet
  • From: [email protected] (Juan Garofalo)
• request for transcript: Bruce Schneier and Eben Moglen discuss a post-Snowden Internet
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• request for transcript: Bruce Schneier and Eben Moglen discuss a post-Snowden Internet
  • From: [email protected] (Ted Smith)
• request for transcript: Bruce Schneier and Eben Moglen discuss a post-Snowden Internet
  • From: [email protected] (Juan Garofalo)
• Old response to (new?) thing
  • From: [email protected] (Odinn Cyberguerrilla)
• request for transcript: Bruce Schneier and Eben Moglen discuss a post-Snowden Internet
  • From: [email protected] (Al Billings)
• [Cryptography] Size of the PGP userbase?
  • From: [email protected] (cane)
• [Cryptography] Size of the PGP userbase?
  • From: [email protected] (grarpamp)
• request for transcript: Bruce Schneier and Eben Moglen discuss a post-Snowden Internet
  • From: [email protected] (Juan Garofalo)
• [Cryptography] Size of the PGP userbase?
  • From: [email protected] (grarpamp)
• Aqua - a high bandwidth anonymity system that resists traffic analysis
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• request for transcript: Bruce Schneier and Eben Moglen discuss a post-Snowden Internet
  • From: [email protected] (Jim Bell)
• request for transcript: Bruce Schneier and Eben Moglen discuss a post-Snowden Internet
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• request for transcript: Bruce Schneier and Eben Moglen discuss a post-Snowden Internet
  • From: [email protected] (Juan Garofalo)
• request for transcript: Bruce Schneier and Eben Moglen discuss a post-Snowden Internet
  • From: [email protected] (Cari Machet)
• request for transcript: Bruce Schneier and Eben Moglen discuss a post-Snowden Internet
  • From: [email protected] (grarpamp)
• [Cryptography] Size of the PGP userbase?
  • From: [email protected] (cane)
• fallout of NSA induced difficulties (lots of drinking, self medication)
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• [Cryptography] Size of the PGP userbase?
  • From: [email protected] (James A. Donald)
• Wyden spends weeks preparing for questions to intelligence officials
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• Bruce Schneier to leave BT
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• Alleged NSA co-worker describes Snowden
  • From: [email protected] (Gregory Foster)
• Wyden spends weeks preparing for questions to intelligence officials
  • From: [email protected] (John Young)
• Bruce Schneier to leave BT
  • From: [email protected] (John Young)
• Bruce Schneier to leave BT
  • From: [email protected] (Andy Isaacson)
• Bruce Schneier to leave BT
  • From: [email protected] (David Maynor)
• Bruce Schneier to leave BT
  • From: [email protected] (John Young)
• Gmail's receiving mostly authenticated email
  • From: [email protected] (Jon Callas)
• Aqua - a high bandwidth anonymity system that resists traffic analysis
  • From: [email protected] (rysiek)
• request for transcript: Bruce Schneier and Eben Moglen discuss a post-Snowden Internet
  • From: [email protected] (rysiek)
• request for transcript: Bruce Schneier and Eben Moglen discuss a post-Snowden Internet
  • From: [email protected] (Jacob Appelbaum)
• request for transcript: Bruce Schneier and Eben Moglen discuss a post-Snowden Internet
  • From: [email protected] (Juan Garofalo)
• request for transcript: Bruce Schneier and Eben Moglen discuss a post-Snowden Internet
  • From: [email protected] (Jacob Appelbaum)
• RDRAND used directly when default engines loaded in openssl-1.0.1-beta1 through openssl-1.0.1e
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• Aqua - a high bandwidth anonymity system that resists traffic analysis
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• Aqua - a high bandwidth anonymity system that resists traffic analysis
  • From: [email protected] (Andy Isaacson)
• request for transcript: Bruce Schneier and Eben Moglen discuss a post-Snowden Internet
  • From: [email protected] (Juan Garofalo)
• request for transcript: Bruce Schneier and Eben Moglen discuss a post-Snowden Internet
  • From: [email protected] (James A. Donald)
• Fwd: Jacob impervious to "Rubber Hose Cryptanalysis" performed by Stewart Baker
  • From: [email protected] ([email protected])
• BlueHat v13 crypto talks - request for leaks ;)
  • From: [email protected] (Peter Gutmann)
• [Cryptography] Fwd: [IP] 'We cannot trust' Intel and Via's chip-based crypto, FreeBSD developers say
  • From: [email protected] (grarpamp)
• request for transcript: Bruce Schneier and Eben Moglen discuss a post-Snowden Internet
  • From: [email protected] (stef)
• Aqua - a high bandwidth anonymity system that resists traffic analysis
  • From: [email protected] (Stevens)
• request for transcript: Bruce Schneier and Eben Moglen discuss a post-Snowden Internet
  • From: [email protected] (Stephan Neuhaus)
• request for transcript: Bruce Schneier and Eben Moglen discuss a post-Snowden Internet
  • From: [email protected] (James A. Donald)
• request for transcript: Bruce Schneier and Eben Moglen discuss a post-Snowden Internet
  • From: [email protected] (Joe Wang)
• Fwd: Jacob impervious to "Rubber Hose Cryptanalysis" performed by Stewart Baker
  • From: [email protected] (Jacob Appelbaum)
• request for transcript: Bruce Schneier and Eben Moglen discuss a post-Snowden Internet
  • From: [email protected] (Jacob Appelbaum)
• corektion (re:c4-r3kN.txt (urls))
  • From: [email protected] (brian carroll)
• Fwd: Jacob impervious to "Rubber Hose Cryptanalysis" performed by Stewart Baker
  • From: [email protected] (John Young)
• Fwd: Jacob impervious to "Rubber Hose Cryptanalysis" performed by Stewart Baker
  • From: [email protected] (Jacob Appelbaum)
• request for transcript: Bruce Schneier and Eben Moglen discuss a post-Snowden Internet
  • From: [email protected] (John Young)
• Fwd: Jacob impervious to "Rubber Hose Cryptanalysis" performed by Stewart Baker
  • From: [email protected] (Al Billings)
• Fwd: Jacob impervious to "Rubber Hose Cryptanalysis" performed by Stewart Baker
  • From: [email protected] (John Young)
• Tor funding [was: ranting at Juan's hatebait rapaciously [before that, something about: request for transcript: Bruce Schneier and Eben Moglen discuss a post-Snowden Internet]]
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• Tor funding [was: ranting at Juan's hatebait rapaciously [before that, something about: request for transcript: Bruce Schneier and Eben Moglen discuss a post-Snowden Internet]]
  • From: [email protected] (Kelly John Rose)
• Tor funding [was: ranting at Juan's hatebait rapaciously [before that, something about: request for transcript: Bruce Schneier and Eben Moglen discuss a post-Snowden Internet]]
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• HavenCo - Rebirth?
  • From: [email protected] (grarpamp)
• Tor funding [was: ranting at Juan's hatebait rapaciously [before that, something about: request for transcript: Bruce Schneier and Eben Moglen discuss a post-Snowden Internet]]
  • From: [email protected] (Laurens Vets)
• acoustic side channel attacks against TEMPEST shielded equipment
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• [cryptome] acoustic side channel attacks against TEMPEST shielded equipment
  • From: [email protected] (John Young)
• patterns & tracks (urls)
  • From: [email protected] (brian carroll)
• Fwd: Jacob impervious to "Rubber Hose Cryptanalysis" performed by Stewart Baker
  • From: [email protected] ([email protected])
• request for transcript: Bruce Schneier and Eben Moglen discuss a post-Snowden Internet
  • From: [email protected] ([email protected])
• PVDF and you - (01)
  • From: [email protected] (brian carroll)
• energy harvesting via PVDF - (02)
  • From: [email protected] (brian carroll)
• PVDF as antenna - (03)
  • From: [email protected] (brian carroll)
• tuning piezo antenna - (4)
  • From: [email protected] (brian carroll)
• [cryptography] NIST Randomness Beacon
  • From: [email protected] ([email protected])
• PVDF & microcontrollers - (5)
  • From: [email protected] (brian carroll)
• Malware that's transmitted through sound
  • From: [email protected] (Jim Bell)
• RDRAND used directly when default engines loaded in openssl-1.0.1-beta1 through openssl-1.0.1e
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• energy harvesting via PVDF - (02)
  • From: [email protected] ([email protected])
• energy harvesting via PVDF - (02)
  • From: [email protected] (brian carroll)
• request for transcript: Bruce Schneier and Eben Moglen discuss a post-Snowden Internet
  • From: [email protected] (Bill Stewart)
• Fwd: Whitepaper for Crypto-Torrents
  • From: [email protected] (Randolph)
• NSA holiday talking points humor
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• Vegetation Comsec
  • From: [email protected] (John Young)
• [cryptography] Vegetation Comsec
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• PVDF strategies - (06)
  • From: [email protected] (brian carroll)
• Vegetation Comsec
  • From: [email protected] (brian carroll)
• Human scum: Jim Bidzous of RSA
  • From: [email protected] (gwen hastings)
• Human scum: Jim Bidzous of RSA
  • From: [email protected] (gwen hastings)
• soft backdoors: ECDSA vs RSA vs EdDSA (aka EC Schnorr) (Re: BlueHat v13 crypto talks - request for leaks ;))
  • From: [email protected] (Adam Back)
• RSA complicity or not in the EC_DBRG backdoor (Re: Human scum: Jim Bidzous of RSA)
  • From: [email protected] (Adam Back)
• PVDF and sensing - (07)
  • From: [email protected] (brian carroll)
• Human scum in the crypto/security industry industry
  • From: [email protected] (gwen hastings)
• footnote (07)
  • From: [email protected] (brian carroll)
• soft backdoors: ECDSA vs RSA vs EdDSA (aka EC Schnorr) (Re: BlueHat v13 crypto talks - request for leaks ; ))
  • From: [email protected] (Peter Gutmann)
• RSA complicity or not in the EC_DBRG backdoor (Re: Human scum: Jim Bidzous of RSA)
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• public notice: TLA scrutiny an opportunity for catching capabilities
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• public notice: TLA scrutiny an opportunity for catching capabilities
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• for those going to 30C3: Fwd: USB Sticks for TAILS [and OpenPGPv2 smartcards, and Yubikeys, and ...]
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• FYI
  • From: [email protected] (Steven Greeran)
• FYI
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• FYI
  • From: [email protected] ([email protected])
• FYI
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• FYI
  • From: [email protected] ([email protected])
• FYI
  • From: [email protected] (John Young)
• FYI
  • From: [email protected] (brian carroll)
• FYI
  • From: [email protected] (John Young)
• RSA complicity or not in the EC_DBRG backdoor (Re: Human scum: Jim Bidzous of RSA)
  • From: [email protected] (Tom Ritter)
• RSA complicity or not in the EC_DBRG backdoor (Re: Human scum: Jim Bidzous of RSA)
  • From: [email protected] (Adam Back)
• RSA complicity or not in the EC_DBRG backdoor (Re: Human scum: Jim Bidzous of RSA)
  • From: [email protected] (John Young)
• RSA complicity or not in the EC_DBRG backdoor (Re: Human scum: Jim Bidzous of RSA)
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256 server side support in OpenSSL / Nginx
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• Vegetation Comsec
  • From: [email protected] (brian carroll)
• Vegetation Comsec
  • From: [email protected] (John Young)
• Exclusive: Secret contract tied NSA and security industry pioneer
  • From: [email protected] (Jim Bell)
• Exclusive: Secret contract tied NSA and security industry pioneer
  • From: [email protected] (Juan Garofalo)
• Exclusive: Secret contract tied NSA and security industry pioneer
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• private sector privacy enhancing technology transition for disillusioned IC employees
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• private sector privacy enhancing technology transition for disillusioned IC employees
  • From: [email protected] (Kyle Maxwell)
• Exclusive: Secret contract tied NSA and security industry pioneer
  • From: [email protected] (Kyle Maxwell)
• request for transcript: Bruce Schneier and Eben Moglen discuss a post-Snowden Internet
  • From: [email protected] (Juan Garofalo)
• FYI
  • From: [email protected] (Eric Mill)
• Acoustic Cryptanalysis: Extracting RSA Key From GnuPG by capturing Computer Sound
  • From: [email protected] (Jelle De Taeye)
• Alan Turing Pardoned by Queen Elizabeth II
  • From: [email protected] (John Young)
• stu-iii type4 included; Key Gen Servers; TEMPEST; CMW.....
  • From: [email protected] (Joseph Tag)
• [Cryptography] HSBC's Password Approach: Impressive
  • From: [email protected] (grarpamp)
• [p2p-hackers] [Cryptography] Size of the PGP userbase?
  • From: [email protected] (grarpamp)
• The next gen P2P secure email solution
  • From: [email protected] (grarpamp)
• [cryptography] The next gen P2P secure email solution
  • From: [email protected] (danimoth)
• [cryptography] The next gen P2P secure email solution
  • From: [email protected] (danimoth)
• The next gen P2P secure email solution
  • From: [email protected] (grarpamp)
• [cryptography] The next gen P2P secure email solution
  • From: [email protected] (grarpamp)
• [cryptography] The next gen P2P secure email solution
  • From: [email protected] (grarpamp)
• [cryptography] The next gen P2P secure email solution
  • From: [email protected] (grarpamp)
• The next gen P2P secure email solution
  • From: [email protected] (42)
• [tor-talk] Request for "Tor, king of anonymity" graphic
  • From: [email protected] (grarpamp)
• [tor-talk] Request for "Tor, king of anonymity" graphic
  • From: [email protected] (Troy Benjegerdes)
• [tor-talk] Request for "Tor, king of anonymity" graphic
  • From: [email protected] (grarpamp)
• [cryptography] The next gen P2P secure email solution
  • From: [email protected] (Randolph)
• The next gen P2P secure email solution
  • From: [email protected] (grarpamp)
• [tor-talk] Request for "Tor, king of anonymity" graphic
  • From: [email protected] (Troy Benjegerdes)
• [tor-talk] Request for "Tor, king of anonymity" graphic
  • From: [email protected] (Kelly John Rose)
• [cryptography] The next gen P2P secure email solution
  • From: [email protected] (grarpamp)
• blackflag operations
  • From: [email protected] (brian carroll)
• [tor-talk] Request for "Tor, king of anonymity" graphic
  • From: [email protected] (James A. Donald)
• conceptual theatre
  • From: [email protected] (brian carroll)
• conceptual theatre (addenda)
  • From: [email protected] (brian carroll)
• P2P VPN
  • From: [email protected] (Matej Kovacic)
• [cryptography] The next gen P2P secure email solution
  • From: [email protected] (Randolph)
• Boycott the RSA Conference - List of Honor
  • From: [email protected] (gwen hastings)
• [tor-talk] Request for "Tor, king of anonymity" graphic
  • From: [email protected] (Troy Benjegerdes)
• Article About a Secret Communication Channel in 1980's South Africa
  • From: [email protected] (Alex J. Martin)
• [p2p-hackers] The next gen P2P secure email solution
  • From: [email protected] (grarpamp)
• P2P VPN
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• Boycott the RSA Conference - List of Honor
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• Replacing corporate search engines with anonymous/decentralized search
  • From: [email protected] (Jesse R. Taylor)
• Replacing corporate search engines with anonymous/decentralized search
  • From: [email protected] (Eric Mill)
• 30c3: The Year in Crypto default engines loaded in openssl-1.x through openssl-1.0.1e]
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• automated crash reporting XKeyscore hooks
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• 30c3: To Protect And Infect, Part 2
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• trojan hardware (keyboard black bag implant) circa 2003
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• trojan hardware (keyboard black bag implant) circa 2003
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• trojan hardware (keyboard black bag implant) circa 2003
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• Jacob Appelbaum in Germany
  • From: [email protected] (Jim Bell)
• Jacob Appelbaum in Germany
  • From: [email protected] (Sean Lynch)
• "To Protect and Infect" - the edges of privacy-invading technology
  • From: [email protected] ([email protected])
• "To Protect and Infect" - the edges of privacy-invading technology
  • From: [email protected] (Hannes Frederic Sowa)
• "To Protect and Infect" - the edges of privacy-invading technology
  • From: [email protected] (Hannes Frederic Sowa)
• Jacob Appelbaum in Germany
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• "To Protect and Infect" - the edges of privacy-invading technology
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• Jacob Appelbaum in Germany
  • From: [email protected] (Jim Bell)
• Replacing corporate search engines with anonymous/decentralized search
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• Jacob Appelbaum in Germany
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• Jacob Appelbaum in Germany
  • From: [email protected] (Griffin Boyce)
• Jacob Appelbaum in Germany
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• Fw: Jacob Appelbaum in Germany
  • From: [email protected] (Jim Bell)
• Jacob Appelbaum in Germany
  • From: [email protected] (Joe Wang)
• Jacob Appelbaum in Germany
  • From: [email protected] (Jim Bell)
• Jacob Appelbaum in Germany
  • From: [email protected] (Griffin Boyce)
• Jacob Appelbaum in Germany
  • From: [email protected] ([email protected])
• Jacob Appelbaum in Germany
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• Jacob Appelbaum in Germany
  • From: [email protected] (Joe Wang)
• Jacob Appelbaum in Germany
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• Replacing corporate search engines with anonymous/decentralized search
  • From: [email protected] (stef)
• Replacing corporate search engines with anonymous/decentralized search
  • From: [email protected] (Lodewijk andré de la porte)
• Jacob Appelbaum in Germany
  • From: [email protected] (Bill St. Clair)
• Jacob Appelbaum in Germany
  • From: [email protected] (Silent1)
• Jacob Appelbaum in Germany
  • From: [email protected] (Anthony Papillion)
• Jacob Appelbaum in Germany
  • From: [email protected] (Cari Machet)
• "To Protect and Infect" - the edges of privacy-invading technology
  • From: [email protected] (Hannes Frederic Sowa)
• Jacob Appelbaum in Germany
  • From: [email protected] (Jim Bell)
• Jacob Appelbaum in Germany
  • From: [email protected] (Jim Bell)
• To Protect and Infect Slides
  • From: [email protected] (John Young)
• [cryptography] To Protect and Infect Slides
  • From: [email protected] (Jacob Appelbaum)
• Jim Bell comes to Cypherpunks?
  • From: [email protected] (Jim Bell)
• [cryptography] To Protect and Infect Slides
  • From: [email protected] (brian carroll)
• Jacob Appelbaum in Germany
  • From: [email protected] (James A. Donald)
• [cryptography] To Protect and Infect Slides
  • From: [email protected] (brian carroll)
• Jacob Appelbaum in Germany
  • From: [email protected] (Juan Garofalo)
• [cryptography] To Protect and Infect Slides
  • From: [email protected] (brian carroll)
• Jacob Appelbaum in Germany
  • From: [email protected] (brian carroll)
• Jacob Appelbaum in Germany
  • From: [email protected] (brian carroll)
• [cryptography] To Protect and Infect Slides
  • From: [email protected] (John Young)
• Jacob Appelbaum in Germany
  • From: [email protected] (brian carroll)
• Jacob Appelbaum in Germany
  • From: [email protected] (James A. Donald)
• Jacob Appelbaum in Germany
  • From: [email protected] (James A. Donald)
• Jacob Appelbaum in Germany
  • From: [email protected] (Patrick Mylund Nielsen)
• [cryptography] To Protect and Infect Slides
  • From: [email protected] (brian carroll)
• Fw: Jacob Appelbaum in Germany
  • From: [email protected] (Jim Bell)
• Jacob Appelbaum in Germany
  • From: [email protected] (Al Billings)
• Replacing corporate search engines with anonymous/decentralized search
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• "To Protect and Infect" - the edges of privacy-invading technology
  • From: [email protected] (coderman)
• "To Protect and Infect" - the edges of privacy-invading technology
  • From: [email protected] (Hannes Frederic Sowa)
• "To Protect and Infect" - the edges of privacy-invading technology
  • From: coderman at gmail.com (coderman)
• [no subject]
  • From: Unknown
• [no subject]
  • From: Unknown
• [no subject]
  • From: Unknown
• [no subject]
  • From: Unknown