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Rogue objects in routing databases
- Subject: Rogue objects in routing databases
- From: bortzmeyer at nic.fr (Stephane Bortzmeyer)
- Date: Mon, 27 Jan 2020 19:03:36 +0100
- In-reply-to: <[email protected]>
- References: <[email protected]>
On Sat, Jan 25, 2020 at 12:06:51AM +0100,
Florian Brandstetter <florianb at globalone.io> wrote
a message of 53 lines which said:
> Examples of affected networks are:
>
> 193.30.32.0/23
> 45.129.92.0/23
> 45.129.94.0/24
Note that 193.30.32.0/23 has also a ROA (announces by 42198). So,
announces by AS8100 would be RPKI-invalid.
45.129.92.0/23 also has a ROA. Strangely, the prefix stopped being
announced on sunday 26.
45.129.94.0/24 has a ROA and is normally announced.
So, if AS8100 were to use its abnormal route objects , announces would
still be refused by ROA-validating routers.