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Chinese root CA issues rogue/fake certificates
- Subject: Chinese root CA issues rogue/fake certificates
- From: george.herbert at gmail.com (George William Herbert)
- Date: Wed, 7 Sep 2016 16:39:14 -0700
- In-reply-to: <[email protected]>
- References: <CAB69EHjh+xLBzP+XoEUpo3fRYC_33aQWCEuDZPJc8MtxdshjQg@mail.gmail.com> <CA+E3k91eiwyykLV05fVL89Fd=USe-pzuhFRx4SFaCnuYMYskKA@mail.gmail.com> <CA+E3k923N8JRguG0yfjFg6ZkfhrUxc+CcxwD0Rh9kULgrCvr-Q@mail.gmail.com> <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
> On Sep 1, 2016, at 3:19 AM, Stephane Bortzmeyer <bortzmeyer at nic.fr> wrote:
>
> On Thu, Sep 01, 2016 at 11:36:57AM +1000,
> Matt Palmer <mpalmer at hezmatt.org> wrote
> a message of 45 lines which said:
>
>> I'd be surprised if most business continuity people could even name
>> their cert provider,
>
> And they're right because it would be a useless information: without
> DANE, *any* CA can issue a certificate for *your* domain, whether you
> are a client or not.
It's relevant for a different reason; CA health needs to be monitored, and multiple CAs can (should) be used in case CA A's recognition gets pulled or a catastrophe happens. Having certs from CA B then gets you going either immediately (if you actively use both) or rapidly (if you need to replace certs on web / services front end). Getting new ones from CA B in a hurry can be a major deal.
Sent from my iPhone