de-peering for security sake

[jabley at hopcount.ca (Joe Abley)]

On Dec 26, 2015, at 10:09, Stephen Satchell <list at satchell.net> wrote:

> My gauge is volume of obnoxious traffic.  When I get lots of SSH probes from a /32, I block the /32.

... without any knowledge of how many end systems are going to be affected.

A significant campus or provider user base behind a NAT is likely to
have more infections in absolute terms, which means more observed bad
behaviour. It also means more end-systems (again, in absolute terms)
that represent collateral damage.

> When I get lots of SSH probes across a range of a /24, I block the /24.

[...]

> When I see that the bad traffic has caused me to block multiple /24s, I will block the entire allocation.

Your network, your rules. But that's not the way I would manage things
if I thought my job was to optimise and maximise connectivity between
my users and the Internet.

With respect to ssh scans in particular -- disable all forms of
password authentication and insist upon public key authentication
instead. If the password scan log lines still upset you, stop logging
them.


Joe