Why not to use RPKI (Was Re: Argus: a hijacking alarm system)

[danny at tcb.net (Danny McPherson)]

On Jan 20, 2012, at 8:08 AM, Yang Xiang wrote:

> 
> I think network operators are only careless, but not trust-less,
> so black-hole hijacking is the majority case.

This is aligned with the discussion on route leaks at the proposed 
interim SIDR meeting just after NANOG.

Even with RPKI and BGPSEC fully deployed we still have this 
vulnerability, which commonly manifests itself today even by 
accident. 

RPKI-enabled BGPSEC would give you some assurances that the
ASes in the AS_PATH represent the list of ASes through which the 
NLRI traveled, but nothing about whether it should have traversed 
those ASes in the first place -- so we still need something somewhere 
to mitigate that threat.

See this draft for more information:

<http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-foo-sidr-simple-leak-attack-bgpsec-no-help-01>


-danny