Only 5x IPv4 /8 remaining at IANA

[bygg at cafax.se (Johnny Eriksson)]

"Tony Hain" <alh-ietf at tndh.net> wrote:

> Actually nat does something for security, it decimates it. Any 'real'
> security system (physical, technology, ...) includes some form of audit
> trail. NAT explicitly breaks any form of audit trail, unless you are the one
> operating the header mangling device. Given that there is no limit to the
> number of nat devices along a path, there can be no limit to the number of
> people operating them. This means there is no audit trail, and therefore NO
> SECURITY. 

So an audit trail implies security?  I don't agree.  It may make post-mortem
analysis easier, thou.

Does end-to-end crypto break security?  Which security?  The security of
the endpoints or the security of someone else who cannot now audit the
communication in question fully?

> Tony

--Johnny