Loki-network LLARP I2Pd Torrent Cryptocurrency

[jeff at i2p.rocks (jeff)]

On Mon, Apr 01, 2019 at 04:48:43PM +1100, Zenaan Harkness wrote:
> >  â??â??â??â??â??â??â?? Original Message â??â??â??â??â??â??â??
> > On Sunday, March 31, 2019 7:14 PM, grarpamp <grarpamp at gmail.com> wrote:
> > 
> > > https://loki.network/
> > > https://github.com/majestrate/torrent.ano
> > > http://anodex.oniichanylo2tsi4.onion/
> > > https://i2pd.website/
> > > https://github.com/loki-project/loki-network/blob/master/docs/high-level.txt
> > > https://www.reddit.com/r/i2p/
> 
> 
> On Sun, Mar 31, 2019 at 06:42:54PM +0000, furrier wrote:
> > Monero fork with premine, governance tax, and 50% funds lockup for "market-based sybil resistance". Good luck, I'll pass.
> > 
> > Also, it wasn't clear from a quick look, do they utilize I2P at the networking layer or did they roll out they own custom solution like Kovri?
> 
> 
> Loki network appears to be a ground up rewrite of I2P, with an eye to
> the lower latency and clear-net accessibility of Tor, with newer
> (presumably better) crypto than I2P.

This is correct.

> 
> Appears to ignore the fundamental currently-missing feature in all
> mix-/ anon-/ dark-/ onion-/ etc- nets in existence today - i.e. chaff
> fill, which implies some sort of badwidth/ time reservation/ promise
> between nodes, which is (re)negotiated from time to time between
> nodes.
> 
> This chaff fill feature is the single currently-missing feature which
> is required to begin to handle the problem of global (in a network
> sense) passive adversaries, aka GPAs - i.e. the NSA, the CIA, the
> FSB, etc, i.e. those well-funded entities paid for and run by
> nation-state actors who generally oppress the fundamental rights of
> the rest of us, such as the rights to live, trade, and move about
> within our communities.

I am personally convinced that a flat traffic shape will only dare
attackers to cut links between parts of the network, effectively
making an even larger traffic shape to corrilate with.
I am not convinced low latency systems can be immune to traffic shape 
corrilation and hence that being said, I think state actors are out 
of scope of the current threat model of llarp. 
This may or may not change.