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US: Post Election Protests
From: juan <juan.g71 at gmail.com>
>> Â Entirely unaware of their specific work (but, as I vaguely recall,
>> aware of this general concept; I'd probably heard of it, indirectly,
>> from a third person whose identity I don't recall), I thought of the
>> "Hundreds, or thousands, or millions of 'Person A's', make anonymous
>> contributions to a general offer to potentially any 'Person B' to
>> reward him for 'predicting' the date of death of 'Person C'. Are
>> these two models alike? Â Kinda-sorta, I suppose.
 >  Well, the part about a date for a predicted 'accident' or event
 >  is more original I think (though I certainly haven't researched
 >  it thoroughly), however the bit about something being funded by
 >  many people seems more like the standard working of markets and
 >  so is rather old?
Hey, I didn't claim to have invented the entire concept of markets! Â <vbg>Anyway, in 1995 the terms "crowdsourced" and "crowdfunded" didn't exist. Â AP could be described today quite simply as "crowdfunded assassinations". Â
>>Â But I think they
>> would be enormously different in effect, for many reasons I need not
>> go into here. Â If 'Assassination Markets' were limited to the former
>> model, very few people would be hated, enough, by only one person to
>> obtain a donation sufficient to buy a death. Â In the latter model, a
>> few million 25-cent donations would get rid of nearly all potential
>> targets. I suggest that I did indeed advance the rhetorical
>> state-of-the-world.
>Â Â I think Steve's point about high value targets being hard to
 >  attack is valid. But on the other hand what would happen if
> Â Â 'law enforcement' 'agents' were targeted? The price to get rid
> Â Â of lowly anonymous cops would be a lot smaller. Working as a cop
> Â Â would stop being appealing. And with no state 'law'
> Â Â 'enforcement' there are no state's 'laws' and ultimately no
> Â Â state.
I don't disagree that "high value" targets would be more difficult. Â But not that much. Â And if they are indeed "high-value", that implies that large numbers of people would be ready and willing to donate to see them gone. Â And the fact that the AP bounty can be collected by ANYONE makes it hard to defend against. Â Even a person's bodyguards (and especially them!) would be able to stage an attack, and collect the reward.
>>Â Rather, my
>> intent was to show that the kind of tools necessary to implement AP
>> are being considered and produced. Â Just "the kind of tools", not
>> necessarily the tools themselves. Â TOR should be made stronger, with
>> more hops, more exit nodes, and more transfer nodes, filler traffic,
>> for some examples of improvements.
> Â Â Tor is a brand of the tor corporation which in turn means the
> Â Â pentagon. It's pretty much a dead end (and that's the way its
> Â Â owners intend it to be, obviously)
And that's a real shame. Â It's still useable, within its limitations.
 Â
>Â Bitcoin needs an upgrade, for
> example to Zerocoin, to provide true anonymity, rather than mere
> pseudonymity. Â
   Yes...
   (rest of your message is a reply to Steve so I won't comment)
>
> > The betting pool itself would alert
> No, it would not. Â Unlike the Federal Government's short-lived
> proposal in 2003, PAM "Policy Analysis Markets", (FutureMAP),
>  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Policy_Analysis_Market ;  in which the
> state of the betting itself alerts people to threats, a well-designed
> AP system would carefully avoid alerting the public (or anyone) to
> bets, ideally until later, after the event predicted had materialized
> or failed to materialize. Â The 'money' for the bet might be inside an
> encryption envelope, without the name of the target or date. Â Another
> encryption envelope, inside the first one, could contain the target
> and date information. Â The AP organization could decrypt the first
> (outer) envelope, and be unable to decrypt the inner one, at least
> until the password is sent in by the predictor. The AP organization
> would, however, publish the decrypted contents of the outer envelope,
> so that everyone would know that a prediction with $X of value came
> in on a specific date and time. Nobody, except the predictor, would
> know the identity or date. Â Eventually, the inner password would be
> sent in, used to decrypt the inner envelope, with the results
> published online. Â If the AP organization cheats, by <snip> failing to
> perform one of these steps, the predictor could publish the inner
> prediction key himself, disclosing to the public that the
> long-since-published content of the outer encryption envelope was a
> valid prediction, and for some reason (fraud?) the AP organization
> did not play fair. Â That would destroy the credibility of that
> specific AP organization; others would soon take its place.
>
> > potential targets to take proportional defensive measures, which "at
> > best" would inhibit the social progress promoted by the system.
> The system would adapt. Â Consider Le Chatlier's
> Principle.  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Le_Chatelier%27s_principle
> A working AP system might, for example, authorize spending (for
> concreteness) 10% of donations on defensive contracts: Â Consider the
> effect of a $250,000 reward on the prosecutor in a case alleging an
> AP action, or $500,000 for a judge. Â Or perhaps a reward of $100,000
> for each juror who participated in such a trial, and voted for
> acquittal, where the outcome was such that a retrial would be
> impossible, or at least did not occur. Â Â Such rewards could become
> very high, in large part because there would rarely be legal cases in
> which they would have to be paid. Â
>
> > But other than that...\
>
> "Other than that, Mrs. Lincoln, how did you like the play?"
> Â Â Â Â Jim Bell
>
>Â Â
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