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Once again: Tor timing attacks and a Tor confession
- To: [email protected]
- Subject: Once again: Tor timing attacks and a Tor confession
- From: [email protected] (Georgi Guninski)
- Date: Tue, 1 Mar 2016 08:54:54 +0200
- In-reply-to: <CAD2Ti2911evPsw0dZQWXvTr9Wgu6Su5PHDytQc81iAUJgMde9w@mail.gmail.com>
- References: <[email protected]$> <CAD2Ti2_+348bjcA5eaNrqvECU45=eJPspu0xhPdj4hntuP0cHQ@mail.gmail.com> <[email protected]$> <CAD2Ti29is2Z-6qJFgh8OG1UrAHPae++PZyfZ1-iuADXG=Bd9pQ@mail.gmail.com> <[email protected]$> <CAD2Ti2911evPsw0dZQWXvTr9Wgu6Su5PHDytQc81iAUJgMde9w@mail.gmail.com>
Is jitter/fill traffic full solution?
What if they disrupt or slow X times your traffic to Tor?
This will be observable at the other end.
Probably easier is to just own me via some application
sploit (as suggested in this thread).
RE: cost of ownage/minor offenses.
Don't exclude the possibility single investment to result
in compromise of all of Tor and then deanonimizing will
be just a simple query.
In one Snowden slide there was something like:
"NSA can deanonimize some Tor users ...
but we don't want to scare all of them".
This is consistent with the fate of Lulzsec.
According to the official story (which I don't believe),
the first of them got caught because "he forgot to use
tor when on irc..."