Google'es End-to-End

[rysiek@hackerspace.pl (rysiek)]

OHAI,

Dnia Å?roda, 4 czerwca 2014 00:19:43 piszesz:
> > not sure what to think about this one:
> > http://googleonlinesecurity.blogspot.com/2014/06/making-end-to-end-encrypt
> > ion-easier-to.html
> > 
> > Technical specs:
> > https://code.google.com/p/end-to-end/
> 
> If you want to land on a watch-list and maybe no-fly list, you just install
> it in your Chrome. Because as far as we can tell Google is in bed with the
> NSA and so the proprietary browser may just flag you to the system and done
> you are, or may forward all your messages in the clear. Who knows? Which is
> worst?
> 
> That's why there is not foocking way to trust proprietary software.
> Companies are forced to act like criminals on behalf of the government.
> There is no loyalty, respect, ethics, honesty or even business which the US
> government won't try to trample upon.
> 
> If one wants to go crypto, he goes all the way with OpenBSD, Tails, Kali,
> Gentoo, Firefox, Midori or even old and good Lynx, but not Chrome.
> 
> lol

A heck with it, why not -- I'll play the Google's advocate here.

So, the extension itself will be FLOSS, as I understand, so the extension 
itself will be audit-able (inb4 openssl, truecrypt). And as I understand it 
*will* be installable in Chromium too.

Is that an acceptable combination? With such an assumption ("use Chromium, 
Luke!"), does End-to-End seem to make sense? Or are there other problems we 
need to look into and be wary of?

-- 
Pozdr
rysiek
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