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- <li><em>date</em>: Thu Nov 4 18:58:16 2004</li>
- <li><em>from</em>: esoteric at 3times25.net (Geoffrey)</li>
- <li><em>in-reply-to</em>: <<a href="msg00178.html">[email protected]</a>></li>
- <li><em>references</em>: <<a href="msg00072.html">[email protected]</a>> <<a href="msg00141.html">[email protected]</a>> <<a href="msg00146.html">[email protected]</a>> <<a href="msg00178.html">[email protected]</a>></li>
- <li><em>subject</em>: [ale] Its over. Maybe</li>
I'm not suggesting that there should be 10 vendors building voting
machines, what I'm suggesting is that all electronic voting machines
should be reviewed by someone other than parties who have a vested
interest in said company. You can attack a monopoly on either axis.
>> Second, the systems should be reviewed by non-partisan technically
>> capable people.
>
> Obviously correct.
>
>> Third, voting devices such as these should be randomly seized and a
>> complete verification of the system be completed, again by a
>> non-partisan group. That's to say, they could walk into a polling
>> place, anywhere in this country, select a machine and after
>> protecting the existing votes on that device, proceed to validate
>> and verify that it is functioning correctly.
>
> That's crazy. Even just considering the technical aspects, how does
> one "validate and verify". If we knew how to do that we wouldn't
> have security problems any more. I believe there is a meta-theorem
> which says you cannot validate a sufficiently complex system--and
> these are more than sufficently complex.
If they are that complex, they should not be used. It's not bloody
rocket science, you're counting votes.
> The whole point of a paper trail is that it protects against unknown
> attacks. Even if the bad guys come up with a diabolically clever
> attack which avoids detection by looking at the system, the
> electronic and paper ballots will not agree. The attackers would
> have to subvert the hard copies, too, which we have a lot of
> experience preventing. Furthermore, electronic fraud is done
> wholesale and paper fraud is retail--it would be extremely difficult
> to get them to agree.
I'm also concerned with an inside job. Sure, you get a paper trail of
how people voted, but is that compared to the electronic totals? How do
you know the machine is tallying the same way it's printing?
--
Until later, Geoffrey
</pre>
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<li><strong><a name="00195" href="msg00195.html">[ale] Its over. Maybe</a></strong>
<ul><li><em>From:</em> jimpop at yahoo.com (Jim Popovitch)</li></ul></li>
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<li><strong><a name="00072" href="msg00072.html">[ale] Its over. Maybe</a></strong>
<ul><li><em>From:</em> jcf at primeharbor.com (Chris Farris)</li></ul></li>
<li><strong><a name="00141" href="msg00141.html">[ale] Its over. Maybe</a></strong>
<ul><li><em>From:</em> kafka at antichri.st (George Carless)</li></ul></li>
<li><strong><a name="00146" href="msg00146.html">[ale] Its over. Maybe</a></strong>
<ul><li><em>From:</em> esoteric at 3times25.net (Geoffrey)</li></ul></li>
<li><strong><a name="00178" href="msg00178.html">[ale] Its over. Maybe</a></strong>
<ul><li><em>From:</em> mhirsch at nubridges.com (Michael D. Hirsch)</li></ul></li>
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