[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]
[ale] OT: Electronic Voting in GA
- Subject: [ale] OT: Electronic Voting in GA
- From: mhirsch at nubridges.com (Michael D. Hirsch)
- Date: Wed Oct 29 09:22:26 2003
- In-reply-to: <1067368337.28572.521.camel@localhost>
- References: <[email protected]> <[email protected]> <1067368337.28572.521.camel@localhost>
On Tuesday 28 October 2003 02:12 pm, Jeff Hubbs wrote:
> On Tue, 2003-10-28 at 12:59, Michael D. Hirsch wrote:
> > On Tuesday 28 October 2003 09:36 am, Bjorn Dittmer-Roche wrote:
> > > On Tue, 28 Oct 2003, Bob Toxen wrote:
> > > > On Sun, Oct 20, 2002 at 11:25:58PM -0600, Joseph A Knapka wrote:
> > > > > Public key cryptography allows us to achieve provably
> > > > > secure electronic voting, immune from this sort of
> > >
> > > I should dispell a myth here. Public key cryptography has NOT been
> > > proven to be secure through any mathematical process.
> >
> > True--that is one reason why quantum crytography looks so cool. It is
> > provably secure. At the moment, it is also damn hard to do, but it's
> > getting easier every year. Until that time, or someone proved P != NP,
> > we'll have to settle for something that has every appearance of being
> > secure without an exact proof.
<snip>
> Here's a rule of thumb: suppose you could beam Leonardo De Vinci, Thomas
> Edison, or Ben Franklin to the present day. Could these intelligent and
> capable men from their respective times examine, comprehend, and verify
> the voting process to their satisfaction, Even if they had to learn about
> new things to do so?
Understanding why quantum cryptography is secure is within the grasp of any
technologically literate person, so I don't think they would have trouble
understanding that. Verifying a voting process is a different question
entirely, one I was not talking about. I was only responding to the
statement that PKC was not provably secure.
> Say all you want about quantum cryptography, but how to you keep it or any
> other mechanism from being perverted or subverted?
Hell if I know. Voting mechanisms have so many possible failure points that
the security of the transmission is probably the part I worry about least.
Given the insecurities of recording the proper vote initially, insecure
storage mechanisms, no audit trail, etc, why would anyone bother trying to
crack the transmission security?
Michael